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From Judicial Passivity to Judicial
Activism: Explaining the Change with-
in Costa Rica's Supreme Court*
Bruce M Wilson and Roger Handberg**
"In Costa Rica one talks of: before the Sala [constitutional court], and after the Sala.'
I. Introduction.
Over the past three decades a global change has occurred regarding the role of courts
within their respective societies. Courts have placed themselves or been placed in posi-
tions of extraordinary political influence compared to earlier eras. The American disease
of judicial activism with its sword of judicial review has spread to societies historically
hostile to such activities. Most of that activity has occurred in common law-derived court
systems or in political systems where the regime has failed either through military defeat
or political disintegration. Thus, for example, the German Constitutional Court stands as
a special institution placed outside the regular judiciary. Also, former socialist law coun-
tries are struggling to construct new legal mechanisms to cope with the dramatic change
attendant upon regime collapse and reconstruction.
In each of those situations, change evolved because no choice effectively existed other
than leaving the status quo for a new system. Within Latin America, legal traditions appeared
strong, with a consensus as to the minimal role of the courts. In most Latin American coun-
tries, courts were routinely defined as political ciphers or adjuncts to the regimes. This was
thought particularly germane given their civil law traditions and turbulent political histories.
Courts were largely ignored as politically neutral (meaning supporters of the forces of order)
or politically irrelevant due to their passivity in the face of disorder.
* The authors would like to thank David Keith Sherwood and Ariam Ferro for research assis-
tance in the preparation of this article.
** Dr. Bruce M. Wilson is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Central
Florida. He is the author of Costa Rica: Politics, Economics, and Democracy (Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Reimer 1998) and numerous articles on Central American political economy that havebeen
pubished in Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Studies in Comparative
International Development, among other journals Roger Handberg is a Professor of Political
Science at the University of Central Florida. His B.A. in Government was from Florida State
University (1996), Ph.D. (1970). Published work on courts and law has included articles on public
opinion an courts, comparative courts generally, Southern county sheriffs, the Florida Sentencing
Guidelines, the Florida Court System, and decison making at the United States Supreme Court.
Present work focusesupon the development of alternative systems of judicial review.
1. Jos6 Miguel Corrales quoted in JAIME VIQUEZ MURILLO, LA SALA CONSTITUCIONAL: UNA
REVOLUCION POLITCO-JURIDICA EN COSTA RICA 7 (1994).
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Despite Latin America's well-established legal political traditions, court behavior, espe-
cially at the Supreme Court level, has begun changing significantly. Supreme courts are aban-
doning, albeit slowly, their traditional passive acceptance of constitutionally questionable
executive and legislative actions and are endeavoring to become aggressive protectors of con-
stitutional rule and of citizens' constitutional rights. Supreme courts become particularly
powerful agents for change due to their national visibility. This assertiveness, however, has
often led to negative reactions by governments, clearly surprised and dismayed by court
activism. Thus, the results produced have been uneven, such as suppression of court assertive-
ness occurring in Peru, 2 or the stuffing of the Supreme Court in Argentina, 3 but the general
trend is clearly in the direction of increased court openness to change. In fact, in a number of
states, power holders have begun, at least tentatively, accepting this heightened court role.
Thus, the question becomes what motivates this radical change in judicial behavior
in Latin America?4 Also, in some cases, why do politicians voluntarily reduce their own
political power by strengthening the Supreme Court, an institution over which they have
no direct control? And finally, what have been the initial political consequences of these
judicial reforms? This paper examines this ongoing judicial reform process through a case
study of the Costa Rican Supreme Court-an institution building upon its constitutional
reforms in the late 1980s.
II. Civil Law Tradition and the Judicialization Process.
Costa Rican courts, like courts throughout Latin America, operate under what has
been classified historically as the Civil Law Tradition.5 This legal tradition draws its intel-
lectual roots from earlier Roman law, especially the form promulgated through the
Justinian Code. That legal institution was revived in the twelfth century and later supple-
mented by other sources of law, including canon law and commercial law, in order to
update the original Code. By the early nineteenth century, this legal tradition had been -
formally adopted in the form of civil codes across continental Europe. Earlier versions of
this civil law tradition were transmitted through the European colonial empires across the
globe. The various Codes promulgated by Napoleon were the prototype for this last
development, reflecting a long developmental process. 6 That legacy clearly influenced the
development of law within the former Spanish colonies, one of which is Costa Rica.7
2. See LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 3-(1998).
3. See Christopher M. Larkins, The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina, 30 (4) CoMP.
POL. 423 (1998).
4. See Carlos Santiago Nino, The Debate Over Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 16
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 635 (1992-1993).
5. The classic overview can be found in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d
ed. 1985). For Costa Rica specifically, see Robert S. Barker, Constitutional Adjudication in Costa
Rica:A Latin American Model, 17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.249, 272 (1986): Professor Barker
provides some of the best early insights into the Costa Rican Supreme Court reform process.
For an alternative taxonomy of law systems, see Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law; Taxonomy
and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. CoMP. L. 5 (1997).
6. See Nicholas D.S. Brumm, Divergent Models of Public Law in Latin America: A Historical and
Prescriptive Analysis, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1992); Alejandro M. Garro, On
Some Practical Implications of the Diversity of Legal Cultures for Lawyering in the Americas, 64
REV. JUR. UNIV. P.R. 461 (1995).
7. See Alejandro M. Garro, Unification and Harmonization of Private Law in Latin America, 40
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Embodied in that civil law tradition is the normative expectation that judges will
generally not become involved in areas outside their narrowly prescribed sphere of work.
This prohibition was especially potent regarding intrusions into what is considered the
political sphere. Instead of the common law view of the judge as a craftsman molding the
law to fit the needs of a changing society, 8 the civil law tradition defined judges as legal
technicians applying the principles embodied in various codes to specific cases (i.e. factu-
al situations). Notions of publicly cited court precedent and judges as independent poli-
cymakers or lawmakers were explicitly rejected. 9 Only the state, through its executive or
legislative organs, can make law. Thus, judges decide cases by applying the law as defined
in a code. The code is presumed, in principle, to be reasonably complete, covering the
particular situation within the general tenets propounded. Commentary on the law and
prior court precedent does not constitute a legitimate source of law-that is: such matters
are not used as overt support (i.e., case citation) for a sitting judge's decision. Therefore,
judges cite principles embodied in the applicable code (criminal, commercial, civil, etc.)
as applied to case specific facts. In principle, the differences across various court decisions
on basically similar issues are explained as fact-driven outcomes rather than differing
judicial interpretations of the fundamental principles. In the ideal, judges become deci-
sional ciphers, transmitters of the values expressed in the code-an image of mechanical
jurisprudence in principle even more rigid than the traditional constitutional interpreta-
tion mode found in the American context. Merryman, among others, has argued that this
stereotype reflects the particularly strong influence of the French cases upon the develop-
ment of civil law, 10 and that, in fact, the stereotype is excessively rigid and impossible to
enforce in practice, including within France.
Research into actual practice has found reality to be much more ambiguous than the
decisional starkness implied by a code system considered in the abstract. Judges in conti-
nental European civil law countries are immersed in legal contexts in which precedent
and legal commentary by scholars does influence judge decisions. I I But, unlike their
common law judicial counterparts, civil law judges render decisions in a form that clearly
embodies those underlying influences in the rationale, but become difficult to decipher
from outside the system. In a manner similar to common law judges, civil law judges cite
prior decisions as decisional principles, but not by direct or overt reference as with case
citations found in their common law counterparts. In fact, Shapiro asserts that, because
of this lack of case citation and analysis, legal commentary by law professors becomes
even more critical in transmitting the changing context of the law across the judiciary. 12
AM. J. COMP. L. 587, 605-07 (1992). In the above article, there is a classification of the civil law
systems within Latin America. For a consideration of the effects of civil law upon Latin
American courts, see Joel G. Verner, The Independence of Supreme Courts in Latin America: A
Review of the Literature, 16 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 63 (1984).
8. The classic overview can be found in BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1921).
9. See MERRYMAN, supra note 5, at 22; see generally RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE
LAw: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 259-83 (6th ed. 1998).
10. See John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109, 116 (1996).
11. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS 136, 143 (1981); Doris Marie Provine, Courts in the Political
Process in France, in COURTS, LAW AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 201-02 (Herbert
Jacob et al. eds., 1996).
12. See SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 135, 144; Provine, supra note 11, at 233-36.
Autumn 1999 525
Rather than citing the civil law equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court's United States
Reports, judges are informed by consulting the professional legal commentaries that are
based upon analyses of earlier cases. Cases are officially reported in civil law systems, but
judge opinions become less overtly informative compared to the common law counter-
parts regarding such influences.' 3
However, the more politically sensitive and divisive issue of court involvement in
issues deemed outside its normal purview has proven much more resistant to change. In
the European context, evidence exists that judges have become sensitized to their poten-
tial role as monitors over government actions. 14 However, the exercise of such concepts as
judicial or constitutional review are more commonly embodied in special courts-in
effect, institutions placed outside the regular judiciary. This institutional solution was cre-
ated by judicial reformers in response to their experiences with totalitarian states during
and after World War 11.15 The regular judiciary failed miserably in resisting transgressions
of human and political rights; rather, they usually acted as facilitators for the terror. Their
professional task was narrowly defined as neutral enforcers of the law, but the content of
that law was effectively irrelevant and the court became just another instrument of
repression. One view expressed was that their acquiescence in those inhumane excesses
grew out of their indoctrination into the civil law tradition, thus neutralizing any expec-
tations for independent judicial action. Thus, creating a more politically independent
judiciary, or at least an independent judicial body, demanded creating a new institutional
setting employing decisional frameworks and criteria from outside the confines of exist-
ing law. 16 Therefore, new institutions were created such as the German Federal
Constitutional Court. One consequence, however, was the dissemination of these new
expectations to other parts of the judiciary resulting in a shift of the judicial universe.
That process has been both abrupt and gradual, depending upon the historical context
within which the reform occurred.
For example, Germany, Italy, and Japan, as the vanquished countries in World War II,
had new conceptions of the judicial function impressed (imposed) upon them while
developing new constitutions. Building upon the U.S. Supreme Court historical model
and earlier abortive European precursors, the new court structures contain a higher level
of judicial institutions capable of intervening to protect the fundamental rights and liber-
ties of the people. Practice has been more erratic-overcoming the inertia of past practice
and professional judicial training has proven more problematic than envisioned.
Institutional rules create opportunities that may or may not be pursued depending upon
historical and cultural context and individual initiative. Other societies, whose direct
manipulation by the immediate results of the war is less, but generally influenced by
those historical experiences, have moved in the direction of greater court or quasi-judicial
13. See Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part 1), 1997 UTAH L. REV. 425, 441-
44 (1997).
14. See Alec Stone, Abstract Constitutional Review and Policy Making in Western Europe, in
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 42-46 (Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate
eds., 1992).
15. See Csaba Varga, Transformation to Rule of Law From No-Law: Societal Contexture of the
Democratic Transition in Central and Eastern Europe, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L. 487, 488-91 (0993).
16. See Roger Handberg, Judicialization Across Societies: The Spread of Judicial Power and Social
Power, INT'L J. Or PUB. ADMIN. (in press).
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involvement in what was formerly forbidden territories. The forms have varied, ranging
from the French Council of State 17 (with a very limited conception of the process but one
with striking explicitly political outcomes) to the Canadian Supreme Court 18 or the
Commonwealth Caribbean Courts, which are moving to enforce individual rights based
upon constitutional principles.
This generalized movement has been characterized more broadly as "judicialization" by
social scientists. Judicialization embodies two related but conceptually different components:
1. The process by which courts and judges come to make or increasingly to
dominate the making of public policies that had previously been made
(or, it is widely believed, ought to be made) by other governmental
agencies, especially legislatures and executives, and
2. the process by which nonjudicial negotiating and decision-making
forums come to be dominated by quasi-judicial (legalistic) rules and
procedures. 19
The first part of the above definition focuses upon what one might term the external
perspective or type one judicialization; that is, the relationship of the courts to other
political institutions and the society as a whole. 20 In the second part, type two judicializa-
tion, the focus is upon the internal decisional processes of other institutions and their
growing congruence with legalistic approaches or perspectives on resolving issues. This
latter part can be labeled an internal perspective. Within the United States; the external
perspective has long existed, albeit not without controversy over the degree of judicial
involvement in politics, or judicial activism.2 1 The internal perspective, it is argued, has
proliferated more recently with the spread of an ideology of rights across various soci-
eties, including Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 22 This expansion is alleged to
have even impacted English courts, historically the most resistant to the charms of judi-
cial activism. 23
17. SeeALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE 60-92 (1992).
18. See Carl Baar, Judicial Activism in Canada, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
53-69 (Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991).
19. C. Neal Tate, Why the Expansion of Judicial Power?, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 28 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995).
20. Evidence that Latin American supreme courts are becoming more sensitive to the wider impli-
cations of their role can be seen in their participation in a new organization, the Conference of
Supreme Courts of the Americas. Twenty-seven courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court,
participated in a general discussion of common problems and possible solutions. See Juan R.
Torruella & Michael M. Mihm, Foreword: To Promote and Strengthen Judicial Independence and
the Rule of Law in the Hemisphere, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 969 (1996).
21. See Kenneth M. Holland, Judicial Activism in the United States, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 25-29 (Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991).
22. See Peter H. Russell, The Growth of Canadian Judicial Review and the Commonwealth and
American Experiences, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 29-39 (Donald W.
Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992).
23. Much like the proverbial blind persons inspecting an elephant, scholars examining the notion
of judicial activism in English courts have come to hold very different conclusions. Compare
Nevil Johnson, The Judicial Dimension in British Politics, 21 W. EURO. POL. 148-53 (1998), with
Maurice Sunkin, The Incidence and Effect of Judicial Review Procedures Against Central
Government in the United Kingdom, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 143-
56 (Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992).
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III. The Latin American Tradition.
Supreme courts within Latin America have established a long historical pattern of
political minimalism. That lack of judicial assertiveness has also been compounded by
inefficiency, a lethal combination for any court system. 24 As a result, supreme courts have,
historically speaking, rarely been major political players within national affairs. Indeed,
there is a general consensus that the role of Latin American judiciaries in the first two
hundred years of independence was "minor, if not irrelevant. '25 Given the political insta-
bility often endemic to certain societies, that noticeable lack of impact is not unexpected.
The legal training received by the justices along with a political socialization reinforcing
the perception of weak courts has long cemented their adherence to the status quo and its
pathologies.26
This picture of judicial impotence persisted despite the fact that often within the
national constitutions, along with the procedural weapons available, supreme courts were
charged with the responsibility of protecting their national constitution's integrity. In
fact, many Latin American supreme courts have had greater constitutional support for
their assertion of the power of judicial review than the U.S. Supreme Court has ever pos-
sessed. 27 However, rising above their limitations proved too overwhelming for most
courts. Occasionally, a supreme court might strike a blow for freedom, but that outburst
usually sank amid the quicksand of public indifference and political repression. Too
often, the court was perceived as blatantly pursuing political advantage for one political
faction or the other. The limitations of their legal tradition made appeals to higher law
such as occurred in Marbury v. Madison28 inappropriate. Having no tradition of judicial
assertiveness except as a representative of a political faction (including the government as
one faction), there was no political foundation to stand upon. In fact, many of the initial
constitutional authorizations in the 1840s were expressions of aspiration-inspired by
John Marshall's rhetoric and reasoning.29
That situation of judicial impotence has begun to change in response to several fac-
tors, including more sophisticated justifications for judicial assertiveness and a global
24. See Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow, The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of
the Americas: Remarks, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 11, 15 (1999); Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for
Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 167, 168-71 (1995); T. Leigh
Anenson, For Whom the Bell Tolls ... Judicial Selection By Election in Latin America, 4 Sw. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 261 (1997).
25. Jorge Correa Sutil, Judicial Reforms in Latin America: Good News for the Underprivileged?, in
THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN AMERICA 259 (Juan E. Mendez et al.
eds., 1999).
26. See MERRYMAN, supra note 5, at 147-48.
27. See Michael B. Wise, Nicaragua: Judicial Independence in a Time of Transition, 30 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 519,520 (1994).
28. 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see Robert S. Barker, Constitutionalism in the Americas: A Bicentennial
Perspective, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 891, 896-900 (1988).
29. Compare ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 156 (1989), with
Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S. Constitutional Practice
as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite's Leap of Faith, 46 AM. U.
L. REV. 1483 (1997).
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emphasis upon human rights and the rule of law.30 Latin American politics have not been
immune to the latter as outside interventions both by governments and nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) have pressed for reform. Pressure for establishing the rule of law,
and by extension, human rights protection has come from the United Nations on an
abstract level, from the United States through the USAID programs, and from the World
Bank. 3 1 In addition, NGOs have become larger players in providing emotional and often
financial support for domestic reform groups.32 The process is often erratic and halting,
but the result is at least greater awareness if not acceptance of human rights as a goal.
As Latin American states struggle toward greater democracy, the rule of law becomes
more central; thus, the potential for judicial espousal of the rule of law with its implications
for judicial assertiveness becomes greater. Certain factors have been identified as facilitating
that growth in supreme court power. Among the factors identified earlier by C. Neal Tate are
democracy, separation of powers, politics of rights, interest group use of the courts, opposi-
tion use of the courts, ineffective majoritarian institutions, perceptions of the policymaking
institutions, and (willful) delegation by majoritarian institutions.33 Democracy is almost an
absolutely necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite for courts to operate beyond a minimal-
ist role. Authoritarian regimes do not tolerate potential competitors, whether judicial, legisla-
tive, or factional, inside or outside the government. The resurgence of democracy within
Latin America has fueled much of the drive for court autonomy in protecting individual
rights and the democratic process. Separation of powers implies room for maneuvering by
the courts in the controversies that arise between their co-equal branches. Those competi-
tors, the executive or legislative branches, often look for allies in their struggles with the
other. A politics of rights implies protection for affected minorities against purportedly arbi-
trary majority actions. Judges become central to those controversies, because they interpret
the meaning and extent of otherwise imprecise legal rights. Conversely, their interpretations
may expand very narrow statements of principle.
Dissatisfied groups seek out whatever forums are available to accomplish their pur-
poses. For interest groups and opposition groups (often one and the same), the courts
become one such mechanism-a mechanism often particularly useful because of their
aura of impartiality.34 This avenue becomes particularly relevant when the polity's
majoritarian institutions are rendered ineffectual. This situation can arise due to political
stalemate because of incoherent political parties, other groups' failure to mobilize popular
support, or the persistence of deep divisions within the society leading to political immo-
bility. Likewise, political institutions may be devalued in public perception with courts
concomitantly rated more highly as to their competence or responsiveness.
30. See Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina: Problem or
Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281, 288-94 (1999).
31. For a general overview of the World Bank's perspective on judicial reform see Dakolias, supra
note 24.
32. See Eric Dannenmaier, Democracy in Development: Toward A Legal Framework for the Americas,
11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1997).
33. See Tate, supra note 19, at 28-32.
34. Use of the courts by interest groups has probably reached its greatest development in the
United States. Other countries have been more resistant but there is nothing in principle pre-
venting their use. For examples from the American context, see Mark Kessler, Legal
Mobilization for Social Reform: Power and the Politics of Agenda Setting, 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 121
(1990); LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT (1985).
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Finally, and most devastating for the democratic process, the democratically elected
branches may willfully decline to exercise their powers for several reasons. 35 Legislatures
and executives defer decisions due to excessive controversy or fear of political retribution
by aggrieved constituents. Courts become, by default, the alternative avenues for resolu-
tion of these issues (if a solution is possible). More likely, the courts provide a resolution
that is totally satisfying to none, but binding in the absence of acts by other branches.
This particular default by the majoritarian institutions represents an abdication of
responsibility but occurs as a response to short-term political expediency and calculations
of political advantage.
As noted earlier, Central and South American courts have not been generally includ-
ed in such analyses. 36 This in part reflects the empirical reality that such courts, in order
to have such an impact, must consistently operate in at least a semi-democratic context.
In such situations, courts with their interest in comity and regularity of procedure have
opportunity to operate. In the former Spanish and Portuguese colonial areas, the explana-
tion becomes simple; the judiciaries have normally adhered to the civil law tradition of
judicial deference plus, more concretely, have operated in authoritarian settings where
independent political actors are not encouraged. This tracks the earlier French revolu-
tionary tradition that reflected their experience with earlier courts that were deemed cor- -
rupt adjuncts of the deposed monarchy.37 More broadly, however, judiciaries are recruit-
ed from the privileged elites, a fact normally discouraging particularly innovative judicial
activity since their primary function is protecting the status quo from which they benefit.
Because of this combination of background and context, Latin American judiciaries
have not been considered major candidates for the innovative role implied by judicializa-
tion.38 Empirical evidence also reveals the traditionally secondary role played by Latin
American courts. Such a passive view has persisted in Latin American constitutions since
the 1840s despite concurrent declarations establishing or permitting judicial review.39
Regardless of that authorization, Latin American courts have had only intermittent bouts
of judicial assertiveness that are usually crushed or, more devastatingly, ignored. For -
example, in 1972, when Ecuador's supreme court ruled a series of presidential decrees
unconstitutional, the president, with support from the military, chose to ignore the
supreme court's rulings, dissolved the Congress, and established a civilian dictatorship
instead. 40 More recently, in 1997, President Fujimori of Peru attempted to have four con-
35. See Tom Farer, Consolidating Democracy in Latin America: Law, Legal Institutions and
Constitutional Structure, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1295, 1300-01 (1995).
36. See generally Alilo A. Boron, Latin American Constitutionalism and the Political Traditions of
Liberalism and Socialism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (Douglas Greenberg et al.
eds., 1993). See also John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin America, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 50, 53 (1996). Linarelli identifies additional factors hampering the capaci-
ty of courts to operate successfully in Latin American society and culture.
37. See Merryman, supra note 10.
38. See Felipe Saez Garcia, The Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America and Some Strategic
Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1267 (1998).
39. See Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1987).
40. See Catherine M. Conaghan, Loose Parties, 'Floating' Politicians, and Institutional Stress:
Presidentialism in Ecuador, 1979-1988, in THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE
OF LATIN AMERICA 259 (Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994).
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stitutional court justices removed from the supreme court after they ruled as unconstitu-
tional his attempt to stand for a third presidential term.4 1
IV. Costa Rican Background.
Historically, the Costa Rican Supreme Court played a similar role until 1989, but the
Court now plays a central role in economic and social policy formulation and implemen-
tation. Thus, Costa Rica stands out as both an anomaly and possibly a harbinger of future
events in other countries. Our focus regarding Costa Rica is upon the external (or type
one) perspective regarding its judicial change process. That is, our interest concentrates
upon the situation where the Supreme Court has become an active intervener into affairs
more traditionally defined by the society as solely political, or at least, not judicial mat-
ters. This expansion into new realms is fueled by a number of factors; the exact weight
assigned to each factor depends upon the peculiar historical and political context within
which this high court operates.
Costa Rica, a poor, isolated, and sparsely populated colony, became independent
from Spanish rule in 1821 (although it was part of the ill-fated Central American
Federation until 1838) and initially experienced the same political turmoil and fratricidal
civil wars as its sister republics. Costa Rica, unlike its neighbors, gradually became more
democratic. The country's transition to democratic governance was not a smooth, unidi-
rectional one, nor was it very rapid. Indeed, not until after the 1948 civil war were the
country's political leaders exclusively selected through the ballot box with the expectation
that they would serve their entire terms. Also, the franchise remained very limited until
the civil war, failing to include large groups of the population including women and
blacks. The 1948 civil war was the result of the increasingly undemocratic actions of the
incumbent administrations of Rafael Angel Calder6n (1940-1944) and Teodoro Picado
(1944-1948). The attempt by these two presidents to steal the 1948 presidential election
was the final spark setting the war in motion. 42
In the civil war's aftermath, a compromise among the victorious allies produced a
new constitution and a series of new political institutions designed to prevent a repeat of
the political crisis brought on by the Calder6n/Picado administrations. The strategy
selected was to disperse political power widely among various state agencies and to
impose strict term limits on deputies and the President (one term with no immediate
reelection). The new constitution of 1949 subsequently devolved decision-making power
across the executive, legislative assembly, and the state-funded autonomous institutions.
The role of the judicial branch, after a brief interruption, returned to its pre-war status of
equality with the executive and legislative branches. This occurred because it had
remained largely above the political intrigues that caused the civil war. The Tribunal
Supremo de Elecciones (Supreme Tribunal of Elections, TSE) was also created as a quasi-
fourth branch of government with full responsibility for all questions related to elections.
41. See Andres Oppenheimer, Re-election Issue Stirs Latin American Debate, MIAMI HERALD, May
19, 1997, at A8; Dakolias, supra note 24, at 173. The Supreme Court of Argentina has been
replaced six times since 1946. See Baar, supra note 18.
42. For a general overview of those events and their general impact upon Costa Rican politics, see
BRUCE M. WILSON, COSTA RICA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND DEMOCRACY (1998).
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While the legislative assembly, the executive and autonomous state institutions expanded
their remits and functions during the post-war period, the Supreme Court continued its
civil law tradition, playing a similarly minor role as it had before the promulgation of the
new constitution.
Costa Rican courts, then, before and after the writing of the 1949 constitution, were
similar to those found across Latin America where the civil law tradition, with its inhibi-
tions regarding judge activity, operated. The major difference between Costa Rica and
much of the rest of Latin America was not in the courts themselves, but rather in the civil
culture with its democratic values. Consequently, incremental change occurs if it is in
accord with significant elements of the political elite. Courts must rely upon enforcement
of their decisions by others, clearly a factor limiting their power. That is, courts possess
the power of decision, but not of implementation. That weakness is deliberate in an effort
to keep those who are thought to be remote and arcane decision-makers from abusing
their powers, powers which are potentially extensive and final in most circumstances.
V. Changing the Role of the Judiciary.
During the early 1980s, as part of a general reform of the courts, a proposal was
made to "systematize and modernize constitutional adjudication. ' 43 A special commis-
sion submitted its recommendations in 1985 to the Supreme Court for review. After sub-
stantial revisions, the recommendations were sent to the Legislative Assembly in May of
1986. After amendment by the Legislative Assembly and further review by the Supreme
Court, the final bill was promulgated in October of 1989. The changes were both organi-
zational and procedural in nature, the intent being to widen the court's jurisdiction.
Until 1989, the Court consisted of seventeen members (magistrates) elected by the
Legislative Assembly for eight-year terms. The Magistrates met in plenary session (Corte
Plena) as well as serving in one of three chambers. The workload of the original three cham-
bers was traditionally apportioned by case type. The first chamber, Sala Primera, had seven
members and dealt specifically with civil cases. The second chamber, Sala Segunda, had five
members and was concerned with bankruptcy, work, and family issues, while the third
chamber, Sala Tercera, handled criminal cases. As a result of the 1989 reforms, the first three
chambers continued much of their jurisdiction and caseload, but a fourth chamber was
added, the Sala Constitucional (more popularly known as the Sala Cuarta, hereinafter Sala
IV). In 1989, the number of magistrates was increased to twenty-two, with seven magistrates
serving in the Sala IV, and five in each of the other three chambers. 44
43. The discussion presented here draws heavily upon Barker's earlier work along with supplemen-
tation through personal interviews by the authors with court officials and legislators in 1997
and 1998. See Robert S. Barker, Taking Constitutionalism Seriously: Costa Rica's Sala Cuarta, 6
FLA. J. INT'L L. 349, 370 (1991).
44. Two of the magistrates from the Sala Primera were transferred to the new Sala IV, reducing the
Sala Primera to five magistrates. An interesting facet of the Costa Rican Supreme Court is the
existence of 37 "substitute magistrates" (suplentes), twelve of whom are assigned to the Sala IV,
nine to the Sala Primera, and three to the other two chambers. See Ley Organica del Poder
Judicial, art. 62 (1991). The Suplentes can be asked to serve on specific cases in the absence of a
Supreme Court justice.
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The judicial branch is afforded a significant level of institutional autonomy regarding
the other executive and legislative branches of the state. Since 1957, it has been constitu-
tionally guaranteed six percent of the state's ordinary budget (art. 177) although the gov-
ernment does not always fulfill its obligation. 45 The Supreme Court's magistrates are
elected by the legislative assembly to a specific chamber of the Supreme Court for stag-
gered eight-year terms, and they are automatically reelected unless two-thirds of the
Legislative Assembly's members vote against a specific justice's reelection (art. 158).
Supreme Court Magistrates can be removed only by a two-thirds vote of their peers.
Judicial branch autonomy is further heightened by the Supreme Court's power to select
all the judges and magistrates for lower courts. 46
Institutionally (and at least formally), the Supreme Court is one of three co-equal
branches of the state, although it historically regarded itself as having secondary impor-
tance to the popularly elected branches. Several factors embedded in earlier Costa Rican
political and legal culture rendered the Court less effective than was, in theory, constitu-
tionally possible. These inhibitions became embodied into a series of institutional norms
and rules limiting its effectiveness. Declaring a law unconstitutional demanded a two-
thirds majority of the plenary session of the Supreme Court, i.e., twelve out of seventeen
had to vote for unconstitutionality. This procedural rule meant that, unlike in the U.S.
Supreme Court, a simple majority was insufficient to declare a law null and void, reduc-
ing the capacity of the Court to declare laws and decrees unconstitutional. 47 This ques-
tion was largely moot, given the Court's general deference to the political branches.
" A second important limitation reflecting the civil law influence was the Supreme Court's
presumption that the Legislative Assembly was sovereign and the assumption that its laws
were constitutional unless they were clearly and evidently unconstitutional. In fact, Costa
Rican history is replete with examples of the president asserting his power to declare certain
laws unconstitutional. 48 Thus, the Court acted only when laws were clearly against the "letter
of the law" as narrowly interpreted, taking no action if the state's action was merely against
the "spirit of the law" This presumption is compatible with a civil law tradition that treats
executive and legislative actions as including both the ordinary and the extraordinary. Unlike
their common law cousins, judge discretion is kept as limited as possible although it is recog-
nized that the courts may be the only institution capable of defending the constitution due to
their presumed disengagement from the ordinary politics of the day (an heroic assumption
rather than an empirical reality in most cases). The degree of that political disengagement is
not always completely clear, but in principle the impartiality attributed to courts means that
they are less openly engaged in daily political struggles.49
In addition, the Constitution made no specific mention of the power of the Supreme
Court to control or adjudicate actions taken by state-financed agencies. These agencies, at
their height, employed a significant percentage of the country's workforce and spent a
large percentage of the government's budget on a broad spectrum of economic and social
45. See, e.g., La Naci6n, April 1998.
46. See LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 219-
32 (1998).
47. See MURILLO, supra note 1, at 19.
48. See Barker, supra note 28, at 252.
49. See Barker, supra note 43, at 362-63.
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services. In 1950, autonomous institutions spent slightly more than seven percent of the
country's GDP. By 1970, with the continued expansion in the public sector, the percent-
age of GDP spent by autonomous institutions increased to 17.4 percent and to thirty per-
cent in 1994.50 This omission becomes especially important because of the increasing
span of government operations encompassed by such entities.
The lack of specificity regarding court review of those administrative agencies was mir-
rored by a general lack of specificity within the Constitution regarding whether the Supreme
Court was the sole authority dealing with all instances of unconstitutionality. Such vagueness
is not unusual-the U.S. Constitution does not make such an explicit delegation of authori-
ty-but given the legal tradition, within which the Costa Rican Supreme Court operates, the
lack of such a specific declaration inhibited the magistrates from taking independent action.
That omission does not prevent such action, but the Court looks for explicit popular autho-
rization to proceed or some other overt signals from the elites, such as the later 1989 reforms
that such activity would not be unsupported. Contrast this to the U.S. Supreme Court in
1803, when the Court, led by Chief Justice John Marshall, moved forward in fairly direct
defiance of the sitting President and Congress.5 1
An additional set of factors that inhibited such judicial activity included the reality
that within the Costa Rican legal profession there was a dearth of attorneys trained as
constitutional lawyers or experts. 52 Such a paucity of trained and experienced advocates-
limits the Court's innovativeness because it is often through the arguments put forth by
skilled practitioners that the Court becomes informed and possibly persuaded that
change has become necessary. 53 Constitutional litigation in itself presupposes a view of
the courts and their role that is much more expansive than traditionally thought possible-
within a civil law system. Therefore, such advocacy implies a change within the political-
culture that rolls over into the legal culture. The "new" advocates are often motivated by-
particular grievances or ideological perceptions, seizing the opportunity for fostering.
desired change. 54
Previously, however, the Supreme Court was encouraged to defer decisions. Realistically,
most judges do not push the legal system's boundaries or the tradition in which they are"
socialized. Instead, they tread the well-worn pathways of legal conformity. One tool that
facilitates adherence to the status quo is strict observation of procedure. The Costa Rican
Supreme Court was characterized in the earlier period as being extremely conscious of prop-
er legal procedure and form. Failure to meet these paper requirements (most of which
remain waivable at Court discretion) leads to dismissal or rejection of cases without a formal
decision, a de facto acceptance of the status quo. The result was a Court generally able to
deflect any movement outside the boundaries of "normal" law. Obviously, serious contem-
plation of constitutional issues clearly contains the potential to move outside the routine.
50. See 2 BRUCE M. WILSON, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN COSTA RICA: A COUNTRY STUDY (Rex
Hudson ed., in press).
51. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 300-26 (1996).
52. See MURILLO, supra note 1, at 20.
53. See the more general discussion of the necessity for supportive legal reform organizations in
CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS AND SUPREME COURTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 11-25 (1998).
54. See Barker, supra note 43, at 396-97.
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Prior to 1989, the Costa Rican Supreme Court was not so much hostile as they were
indifferent to demand that the institution become a. major agent for constitutional
change. Instead, the magistrates operated within the boundaries of what they perceived as
normal judicial politics-a situation effectively minimizing the courts' involvement in
larger political debates. Many Costa Rican jurists claimed that this lack of action by the
Supreme Court had resulted in the "tyranny of the law" that amounted to 170 years of
disrespect for the constitution.5 5 Courts, however, fulfilled their primary social functions,
defending the status quo and resolving disputes within the confines of the existing rules.
Fostering change demanded a reform occur in the Court's basic operating premises-
restructuring the institutional context within which the Court would operate. The change
would have to be fairly dramatic, given that authorization for a wider judicial role in
principle already existed on paper.
VI. Fostering Change.
In making the changes we will describe, the Legislative Assembly embarked upon a
voyage into new judicial and political waters, whose ultimate destination was, and
remains unclear. However, these changes came to the Costa Rican Supreme Court for a
variety of not always well-connected reasons, but the general result completely restruc-
tured the institutional rules under which the Supreme Court operates. Here, we discuss
the factors that motivated that original change, the actual changes made in institutional
structure and procedural rules that occurred, and some indications of the changes' effects
upon public policy.
A. CHANGING THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT.
Courts operate within specific institutional contexts: political circumstances, rules of
procedure and authorizing statutes and constitutions. These institutional contexts estab-
lish the framework (often very detailed) within which the courts work in pursuance of
their assigned functions. Whenever that context changes in some significant fashion, the
courts respond, albeit often imperfectly and slowly, to accommodate that change or their
perceptions of change. A lag effect most likely exists between the change and its accom-
plishment, given slowness in personnel turnover and the deliberate but slow movement
of litigation through the appellate court processes. Over time, though, such institutions
and their rules are plastic; that is, they are continually being reshaped to fit their new con-
ditions. Failure to adapt or excessive delay in doing so can lead to political irrelevance.
Therefore, courts are normally forced to change, despite their wishes, by revisions in their
operating rules-especially those changes imposed by powerful outsiders. For example,
dissatisfaction with court decisions in specific policy areas can lead to changes in jurisdic-
tion, procedures and substantive decisional guidelines. Such changes have characterized
courts in every society.5 6 Even the U.S. Supreme Court has had to endure that public
humiliation when jurisdiction was abruptly removed, nullifying the court's actions. 57
55. MURILLO, supra note 1, at 37.
56. See Provine, supra note 11, at 203-04.
57. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
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For the Costa Rican Supreme Court, this sequence occurred in 1989, when the
Legislative Assembly changed both its organizational structure and procedural rules. The
dissatisfaction here was the culmination of larger societal events rather than a specific
dislike of earlier Court policy choices. According to some commentators, the expansion-
ary nature of the state encouraged a "disrespect for the constitution and fundamental
rights" on the part of lawmakers. 58 Lawyer Juan Jos6 Sobrado, for example, claims that
before the creation of the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court, the Legislative
Assembly routinely passed "unjust discriminatory laws:' and, consequently, the "state of
law did not function."59
Thus, in Costa Rica it is generally agreed that the creation of the Sala IV was a constitu-
tional revolution in general, and of public law specifically. Expanding state actions into new
areas of Costa Rican political and economic life brought the need for protection from abu-
sive state actions into sharp relief. These protections were broader than merely procedural
rights and included explicit concerns with substantive policy. The political emphasis over
time focused upon the question of protection of fundamental individual rights.
Accomplishing such a task was difficult in a political system that emphasized the dominance
of the political branches; their decisions are normally presumed to be in conformance with
constitutional norms while the judicial branch held itself in a secondary position.
The 1989 reforms were typical of major policy changes in Costa Rica. That is, they
were gradual and discussed at length among all interested groups.60 In this particular.
case, the constitutional reforms that created the Constitutional Chamber and ushered in a
new era of activist Supreme Court decisions were the product of more than twenty years
of debate and controversy involving supreme court magistrates, politicians from both
major parties, jurists, and both the executive and legislative branches of government. One
factor driving the debate was the problem of a government expanding into areas formerly
seen as private. By the 1980s, the state was one of the country's major employers and a
major producer of goods and services on an unprecedented scale.
With this expansion, the state imposed and administered price controls and subsidies'
for particular industries while also providing high levels of tariff protection for infant'
industries. Concurrently, the state moved heavily into the general posture of being the
provider of extensive social welfare benefits, especially compared to its past history and
the practice of neighboring governments. This expansion of the role and scope of state
interventions clearly raised the specter that protection was needed over the exercise of
state power-protections broader than merely procedural rights but dealing with policy
substance. In time, the political emphasis focused upon the issue of establishing protec-
tion for fundamental individual rights enumerated both in the Costa Rican constitution
as well as international treaties to which Costa Rica was a signatory. As a result, this pro-
tection was extended, for the first time, to include protection of individual's rights from
both the state and other private persons and companies. Their choice was to ignore any
distinction between "state" and "private" action. 6 1
58. MURILLO, supra note 1, at 34.
59. Id. at 37.
60. See, for example, the extensive discussion of policy making in WILSON, supra note 50, chs. 3-5.
61. In that sense, the decision was to go in a direction very different than taken in interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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That endeavor became part of a general court reform.62 The reforms proceeded
along three pathways: modernization of the basic legal codes, restructuring the internal
organization of the court system, and expansion of the Supreme Court's constitutional
jurisdiction. The latter is the focus of our attention here. The initial formal initiative to
reform the judicial branch of government came in 1977 when the Minister of Planning
Oscar Arias created a commission to examine the proposals to reform the constitution,
including the idea of creating a new constitutional court. 63 A second commission was
established by Minister of Justice Carlos Jos6 Guti6rrez in 1982. This commission includ-
ed representatives from the Supreme Court and a renowned constitutional law professor.
The first draft of the report, presented in October 1983, was widely discussed, re-written,
and then presented to the Legislative Assembly in 1986 with the support of the Supreme
Court Magistrates. 64
In 1987, the Legislative Assembly established a "Comisi6n Especial" to study the bill.
Former Supreme Court Suplente magistrate, Jos6 Miguel Corrales (PLN), headed the
commission and invited submissions from members of all affected parties, including gov-
ernment ministers, magistrates and constitutional scholars. As is required by law, the
magistrates of the Supreme Court commented on the bill and objected to sixteen provi-
sions in the bill. Congress accepted some objections, but others were overridden by the
politicians and remained part of the final constitutional reform. 65 The final reading of
the constitutional amendments to articles 10, 48, 105, and 128 passed by a margin of 43-
6, was signed into law by President Oscar Arias, and the Sala IV began its operations in
October of 1989. The wide margin of passage suggests an elite consensus that judicial
reform was essential for preserving public support for the judicial system specifically and
the regime more generally. The passage of the constitutional amendment also suggests
that politicians were overwhelmingly willing to reduce their own political powers in order
to create the new court. This action appears, on the surface, to be an irrational act on the
part of the politicians. Why would politicians be willing to reduce their political power
and their capacity to make laws through the devolution of power to a Supreme Court
over which they had very little control?
According to then Minister of Justice Maruja Chac6n, most deputies did not actually
understand the policymaking ramifications of their vote in favor of creating a constitu-
tional court.66 Much of the debate was of a technical/legal nature, so that many deputies
deferred to party leaders rather than attempting to struggle through the legal documents
and arguments. Another explanation came from a former PLN deputy (1994-98), Ott6n
Solis. He argues that the new court was created because deputies were convinced that it
was the correct action to take and would make Costa Rica a more democratic country.67
Remember that Costa Rica is the site for the Inter-American Human Rights Court.
62. See HAMMERGREN, supra note 46, at 226.
63. See MURILLO, supra note 1, at 35.
64. See Barker, supra note 43, at 370.
65. See id.
66. Interview by Bruce M. Wilson with Maruja Chac6n, former Minister of Justice of Costa Rica,
San Pedro, Costa Rica (Aug. 1998).
67. Interview by Bruce M. Wilson with Ott6n Solis Fallas, former PLN deputy, San Jose, Costa Rica
(Aug. 1997).
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Also, due to an economic crisis in the early 1980s, there was recognition that consti-
tutional reform might be necessary if the country was to avoid a severe legitimacy crisis.
Accusations of corruption were leveled at the state in general, and against the Judicial
Power (Poder Judicial) specifically. This focused attention upon the courts, resulting in a
number of magistrates of the Supreme Court being investigated by a Legislative
Commission. Declining public support for the Court, it was feared, might spread to a
more general decline in support for government institutions and, more generally, for a
democratic form of government. This crisis helped concentrate the attention of magis-
trates and politicians on the general need for judicial reform, and, in particular, the need
for a constitutional court to interpret the constitution and to make rulings on the consti-
tutionality of government decrees and laws. 68
Judicial reform became the vehicle by which the Legislative Assembly could demon-
strate its concern without committing itself to more fundamental restructuring. If the
Legislative Assembly and magistrates of the Court were focused on judicial reform, it is
clear from the way that the debate was carried in the leading newspapers that the reforms
attracted little attention of journalists or the public. News stories concerning the constitu-
tional amendment were few and were relegated to pages deep within the papers or merely
included as Legislative reports, without commentary.69
The Legislative Assembly's apparent lack of interest in the question of the creation of
a constitutional court is perhaps partly explained by other major crises that absorbed the
legislators' attention. A primary concern was the attempts to strengthen the fragile
Central American peace accords, which had been initiated by Costa Rican president Oscar.
Arias, and the deterioration of relations between Panama and the United States. The
Assembly was also struggling with the question of adopting another Structural
Adjustment Loan from the World Bank, which contained politically unpleasant austerity -
measures. The country was also debating the question of Costa Rica's membership in the
proposed Central American Parliament and was deeply into the election campaign for the
leadership of each party's presidential candidate. Coverage of the issue of creating a new
constitutional court was more complex an issue and not as pressing as the others.
One could argue that since the vote fell toward the end of a legislative term, it was
easier for deputies to sacrifice their powers, as they personally would not be affected.
Deputies are prohibited from seeking immediate reelection due to national term limits.
Furthermore, very few deputies ever return to the Legislative Assembly after their forced
sabbatical from office; in any given assembly more than eighty percent of deputies are
"freshmen." 70 Thus, it is possible to assert that sitting deputies had little vested interest in
sustaining the long-term political power of the Legislative Assembly.
68. See MURILLO, supra note 1, at 39.
69. This paragraph is based on a close reading of the leading daily newspaper, La Nacidn, through-
out the period of the Legislative Assembly debates on the constitutional amendment from
February 1989 to November 1989. After the vote to create the Constitutional Court, a major
debate concerning the appointment of magistrates to the new court did consume the
Legislative Assembly and was extensively covered in the paper throughout the month of
September 1989.
70. See JOHN M. CAREY, TERM LIMITS AND ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION 77 (1996).
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Judicial ref6rm occurred in 1989 because there was no organized opposition.
Institutional factors such as term limits reduced the legislators' incentives to protect the
institution they served temporarily. Legal reform groups were assertive but comparatively
powerless previously. A window of opportunity arose that was seized by those advocating
changes. Outside agents such as USAID and the World Bank assisted in the sense that
they were pursuing legal reform, generally, that became part of the change. For most deci-
sion-makers, the issues were esoteric and.removed from any sense of personal urgency
since the now-visible political consequences were not salient until later. The earlier
drawn-out technical discussions over jurisdiction and procedural reform had disarmed
most critics. The result, as we will briefly discuss, was a major infusion of power and
authority into an institution formerly thought docile.
B. CREATING THE SALA CUARTA.
Law No. 7128, which passed on August 18, 1989, amended articles 10, 48, 105 and 128 of
the constitution. The reform of article 10 created a fourth chamber within the Supreme
Court, a chamber with a much more expansive definition of its powers, including the power
to declare rules (normas) of whatever origin and acts subject to public law (Derecho Plblico)
unconstitutional by a simple majority vote. This new chamber acts alone without the
requirement to consult with the Supreme Court's plenary session or the other three cham-
bers. Thus, theoretically, the new court's ability to declare national laws and actions unconsti-
tutional expanded dramatically. The Sala IV's mandate was to "guarantee the supremacy of
the norms and constitutional principles, international law and community law in force in the
republic, their uniform interpretation and application like fundamental rights and freedoms
consecrated in the constitution or in international instruments in force in Costa Rica."
(Article 1 de la Ley de la Jurisdicci6n Constitucional). The magistrates are to prevent abuses
of legislative, executive, and bureaucratic powers, or the unconstitutional acts of private indi-
viduals or any acts that prevent an individual from exercising their basic rights as contained
in the constitution (article 48). This is broken into two broad categories within which abuses
of government power occur: (I) abuses violating the constitution (broadly interpreted), and
(2) infringements of individual rights.
The former category, abuses violating the spirit of the constitution, is clearly vague
but represents an impressive mandate justifying possibly expansive judicial activity. Its
existence within a civil law political system appears to represent an assumption by the
national elites that the judges remained sufficiently constrained by their legal and political
socialization to continue deferring to the politicians' judgments. Remember that earlier,
the Supreme Court would not consider such challenges with their unlimited discre-
tionary potential. If that was a mistaken assumption, as appears to be the case, then the
magistrates have been granted a broad mandate for a much more intrusive judicial pres-
ence in matters clearly not deemed germane to their traditional functions.
By contrast, infringements of individual rights are more bounded-explicit enumeration
in the Constitution is normally required before court action, although residual clauses may
justify a broader approach similar to the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution's
Fourteenth Amendment. The Costa Rican constitution contains two sections that cover rights
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and individual guarantees (Titulo IV) and rights and social guarantees (Titulo V), which are
analogous to the U.S. Bill of Rights except that they also incorporate social rights.71
Regardless, the 1989 Constitutional Amendment fundamentally changed the institu-
tional framework within which the Supreme Court operates without altering its legal tra-
dition and context. The Court possesses a broad constitutional mandate plus more
relaxed institutional rules, allowing it to assume an activist role regarding protection of
constitutional principles and individual rights if the magistrates so desired. Structurally,
as was indicated earlier, a new fourth Chamber was created to implement the new direc-
tives and to enforce existing directives more fully. The Sala IV has the sole power to inves-
tigate and render an unappealable ruling on all questions of constitutionality with respect
to law and the actions of other branches of government, state-financed agencies, and the
TSE in matters of a non-electoral nature. The latter provision was critical because it effec-
tively left no government or quasi-governmental entity outside the sweep of the reform.
In a positive state context, inclusion of quasi-government entities becomes essential since
many critical public actions affecting individuals occur through their decisions, which are
not classified as laws. Such inclusiveness implies a wider sweeping grant of authority than
one would normally anticipate in a civil law context with its restricted view of the courts'.
role regarding broader social and political matters. This moved the Sala IV beyond mere
administrative review to questions of fundamental authority.
More explicitly, the Sala IV possesses broad habeas corpus powers with the important
provision that such petitions can be presented to the court without the benefit of legal coun-'
sel. In addition, article 48 of the constitution provides amparo, or a more general right of
appeal than habeas corpus.72 This appeal to the Sala IV is to maintain or reestablish all other
rights found in the constitution. In effect, all actions, rules, decrees, orders or laws contrary to
the constitution can be appealed to the Sala IV. This includes actions by individuals (who.
were not covered earlier), a policy choice earlier resisted by the Supreme Court during the
deliberation process but overridden by the Legislative Assembly.73 Furthermore, the Sala IV.-
can now resolve disputes between the various branches of the government as to their respec-
tive powers. New statutes are reviewed as to their constitutionality. In effect, the Sala IV.
encompasses both abstract and concrete, along with a priori judicial review-the widest pos-
sible combination for the exercise of judicial discretion and power.
A further example of the Sala IV's stature is that other magistrates or judges who
entertain doubts concerning the constitutionality of governmental actions, decrees,
orders, or laws may obtain advice from the Sala IV. Their decision becomes binding upon
the requesting court. In effect, Costa Rica has established its judicial equivalent to a con-
stitutional court, except that it remains institutionally embedded within the existing
71. Chapter V of the Constitution contains 24 articles guaranteeing various employment and
social rights. Article 50, for example, mandates the state to provide the best welfare for all
inhabitants, while article 56 requires that the state must pursue a full employment policy.
Article 58 limits the workday to less than 8 hours, article 59 mandates paid vacation time, and
article 60 guarantees the rights of workers to organize in labor unions.
72. See, e.g., MURILLO, supra note I (discussing amparo).
73. See Barker, supra note 43, at 376.
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Supreme Court.74 The location of the court was the outgrowth of a compromise arrived
at between the magistrates of the Supreme Court and the deputies of the Legislative
Assembly. The Magistrates agreed to participate fully in the judicial reform process on the
condition that the new court would remain within the Supreme Court, and that decision-
al power could be reallocated within the court, not be given to a new court outside of the
judicial branch.75 The European constitutional court was the intellectual model being
implemented; however, because of its institutional location, the Sala IV becomes some-
what more difficult to disentangle. 76 Being institutionally contained within the regular
Supreme Court provides institutional cover for an otherwise extraordinary institution.
This embedded quality reflects the reality that, unlike the German situation, the reform
when originally implemented was not perceived as being as powerful as its formal legal
mandate implied. Therefore, perhaps there was an underestimation of the apparent
demand for change; no matter how incoherently the specifics were defined.
The German Constitutional Court operates under a judicial selection process that
deliberately introduced change by incorporating non-traditional (i.e., non-judicial) can-
didates. This was done so that change would not falter due to judge inertia or their fixed
opinions regarding the narrow scope of judicial power. For the Sala IV, on the other hand,
the recruitment process appears on the surface to be an extension of the past. Thus,
recruitment still comes from among the usual suspects, with all seven of the current mag-
istrates having held political or elected appointments prior to their selection to the Sala
IV. Furthermore, two of the original seven were previously magistrates serving on the Sala
Primera of the Supreme Court at the time of Court opening. In fact, the system ignores
the dynamics of creating a totally new institutional setting and concurrently staffing it
with largely new personnel. This combination proved a potent mixture for expanding the
realms of the possible-the new magistrates in effect began quickly testing the limits of
the possible.
The organizational behavior literature has long pointed out that in order to achieve
drastic change one must both destroy and rebuild an existing organization or create a
new entity charged with carrying out the new mission. Organization routines are usually
so well embedded that new ways are automatically suspect and thus rejected. 77 In doing
so, new folkways and procedures are created, allowing for fuller achievement of what the
original reformers desired. If loaded onto existing organizations with well-established,
generally successful routines and decisional patterns, the reform is adapted or maladapted
to fit the Procrustean bed of existing agency value preferences. The Sala IV is an interest-
ing expedient; a new institution was created, encapsulated in the shell of an existing one,
but made separate and more powerful than its counterparts, the other three Chambers.
The struggle immediately became establishing the new agency's boundaries. That process
74. This institutional location is currently (1999) tinder discussion in the Legislative Assembly
where there is a move to make the Sala IV completely separate from the Poder Judicial. See La
Naci6n, June 1998.
75. See Barker, supra note 43, at 390.
76. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 27-30, 162-72 (2d ed. 1997); DAVID R. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 27-30, 149-72 (1994).
77. See GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE
CRISIS 153-58 (2d ed. 1999).
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of adaptation remains a work in progress and was further influenced by subsequent
changes implemented by the Sala IV.
Unlike most courts, the Sala IV aggressively searches for cases, spending a consider-
able sum of money educating individuals regarding their rights and actively encouraging
and facilitating presenting their cases to the court. 78 For example, large poster-sized
advertisements outlining various individual rights appear in all public buildings through-
out the country. There are no age restrictions or citizenship requirements for appeal
directly to the court, and the court receives cases twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year.
Night security personnel are authorized to accept any petition even if the Court Clerk's
office is closed for the day. Furthermore, no lawyer is required for an individual to submit
an appeal of amparo, and the document can be handwritten in any language. 79 Thus, the
court has decisively acted in two ways to increase its caseload, first, through actively edu-
cating people about their rights, and second, by reducing or eliminating the costs and
institutional barriers to bringing an action.
VII. Discussion and Conclusions.
The Sala IV represents a major shift in Costa Rican elite perspectives regarding the
proper role and function of the courts, at least at the Supreme Court level. Through the
constitutional amendment of 1989, the Legislative Assembly expanded the Court's ability
to intervene in state matters for the purpose of protecting the Constitution and, most
explicitly, the rights of individuals against abuse by the state or other private individuals.
Symbolic of this change was one of the first cases heard by the new Chamber, involv-
ing an individual named Trinidad Fuentes Ortega ("don Trino," as he is known). He has a
small wooden cart that he has parked on a street corner outside the Legislative Assembly
building every business day for twenty-five years, selling cigarettes and flavored shaved-
ice drinks (conos).80 In 1989, in preparation for the Summit of the Americas-a meeting
of nearly every head of state in the Americas-the Ministry of Public Security declared
that, due to security concerns, the vendor could not sell his wares in his usual location.
Don Trino appealed to the Sala IV, which ruled in his favor, allowing him to carry on his
business as usual. The Sala IV's ruling made it apparent that its new role was quite differ-
ent from the old Supreme Court. The court acted both swiftly and decisively, demonstrat-
ing that it was willing to protect the rights of poor humble people, even when that deci-
sion might embarrass the government.
That decision, while minor in scope, established the publicly enforced principle that
there now existed effective redress for citizens abused by the government. Symbolism is
often critical in establishing new political or judicial contexts; don Trino's victory was one
of those symbols. The publicity was disproportionate to the practical effect but accom-
plished the Sala IV's purpose of sending a message to the populace and other branches of
the government that the Sala IV was in business.
78. A counterpart court to the Sala IV might be the Indian Supreme Court with their Social Action
Litigation. Compare Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limits of the
World's Most Active Judiciary, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 77-87
(Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992), with Epp, supra note 53, at 71-110.
79. Interview by Bruce M. Wilson with the General Secretary of the Sala IV (Aug. 1997).
80. The individual continues his business up to the present. See MURILLO, supra note 1, at 58.
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The extent to which the Sala IV has taken its remit seriously is reflected in the total
number of cases it receives and deals with each year. In 1990, it's first full year of opera-
tion, it received 2,296 cases and resolved 1,611. In 1997, the last year for which complete
data are available, it received 7,421 cases and resolved 7,104.81 Furthermore, the court no
longer recognized the popular branches of government as policymaking sovereign enti-
ties. In the fifty-one years before the creation of the Sala IV, there were 347 cases of
unconstitutionality taken to the Supreme Court, with 327 of those being resolved. 82 After
the creation of the Sala Constitucional in 1989, more than 350 cases have been submitted
to the court each year, on average, with more than 330 being resolved. 83
The willingness of the Sala IV to challenge the popular branches was well illustrated in
the mid- 1990s, when the court ruled unconstitutional a major privatization measure passed
into law in 1987 by the Legislative Assembly with the support of the Executive branch. In
October 1993, the Sala IV ruled that cellular phone service was a form of telephone service
that was a constitutionally protected state monopoly. Consequently, the government could
not sign contracts with private companies granting them access to the telephone market. 84
Thus, the government's ability to make policy was significantly restricted.
The expanded influence of the Sala IV has produced some negative reaction from
elements of the political elite. Personal interviews with members of the Legislative
Assembly elicited concern that the Sala IV had overstepped the boundaries assumed to
guide courts. One deputy noted many of his colleagues in the Legislative Assembly
believed that "the Sala IV is a power that has taken away a lot of powers from the
Assembly." He personally believed that the Sala IV should not have been created and that
the justices of the Sala IV are judicial activists interested in interpreting the constitution
rather than applying the constitution as it was drawn up by its framers in 1948.85
However, this argument ignores the fact that the 1989 reform was responding to the orig-
inal 1948 Constitution in which the courts were nominal players.
The continued decline in the political parties' capacity to articulate meaningful poli-
cy differences appears to have motivated the search for alternatives to the existing political
institutions.86 As mentioned earlier, one situation where type one judicialization arises is
when the political institutions effectively waive their authority (both willfully and pub-
licly, or implicitly). In Costa Rica, intense dissatisfaction with politics as usual motivated
the change. That change, however, passed through the system on a wave of public indif-
ference. In itself, that is a devastating commentary on the legislative branch. The court
did not seek out this opportunity; rather it was imposed when the Supreme Court's very
cogent objections were overridden by Congress. Judicialization can come through many
doors, especially when the doors are being opened by actors usually thought most hostile
to judicial assertiveness. The legislative branch was collectively uninterested in protecting
its prerogatives, a decision that is currently being rethought. The fact is that the Sala IV
has altered public perceptions of courts, making retrenchment more difficult than previ-
81. Poder Judicial, Sala IV Case Loads, 1990-1997 (unpublished Sala Constitucional document).
82. See MURILLO, supra note 1, at 73.
83. See WILSON, supra note 50, at 58.
84. See La Naci6n, May 15-30, 1995.
85. Interview by Bruce M. Wilson with Ott6n Solis Fallas, supra note 67.
86. See WILSON, supra note 50, chs. 5-6.
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ously. Regardless of the substantive effect of the Sala IV, its actions have created an expec-
tation that the courts are now open to individuals, especially those normally excluded by
lack of wealth or other resources.
Courts operate within the boundaries of the law and social expectations. The justices
of the Sala IV perceived the 1989 law change as expanding expectations as to what could
be done. That view has facilitated the court's expansive role in Costa Rican politics over
the short term. The long-range response by the dominant elites to this change in the
political rules still remains the interesting aspect. The Sala IV has become a wild card as it
tests the limits of its powers and willingness to use them. Moving overtly against the Sala
IV remains one option, but the least likely, given the political splits in the parties reflected
in the Legislative Assembly. A more subtle, but real constraint can be exercised through
controlling who is elected to the Sala IV. As incumbents retire (however, given the pre-sumption of reelection this has proven a norm difficult to overturn), their replacements
become the linchpin in any future restraining of the court. Similar to the Republican
appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court, one can systematically change the Sala IV's
momentum, first on the margins and then more centrally. The Sala IV has instituted
appeals procedures facilitating review, but that is a fragile flower-easily made more diffi-
cult. The original impetus of reform is still operating; time will tell the tale. Change came
to the Costa Rican Supreme Court because of immediate domestic political imperatives,
with the implications still playing out in the nation's politics.
The continued independence of the Sala IV appears to reflect the essentially democ-
ratic nature of Costa Rica's politics. Mobilizing opposition has been further hampered by --
the term limits within the Legislative Assembly, reducing the intensity of the deputies,
since no individual has a long-term commitment to redressing the apparent loss of
power. Unlike most of Latin American supreme courts, conditions in Costa Rica appear -
particularly favorable for an ongoing experiment in judicial activism.
